

CONTACT REPORT

CADROIT/CARBOHYDRATE

Date, Time, and Place of Meeting: 19 Oct 54, 1900-2200, C's Apt.

Present: a. CARBOHYDRATE b. ☐

1. CARBOHYDRATE delivered:

a. The plan over Wunsdorf, which had been returned to him temporarily in case its source, B., came in to West Berlin and C had to deal with him. C reported that as agreed he had asked BR., the refugee who had given C the plan, to come to the CADROIT building for purposes of transferring him to CASTABIA. The camp had informed C that the refugee had been flown out to West Germany (privately, which makes one think of the possibility that the refugee had some earlier connection with intelligence-details on how and who provided the money for the private flight are not available). C hopes that the post card to the source in the "one was really sent by the refugee, and that the source will arrive at CADROIT. If so, the source will go to CASTABIA.

b. Two drafts of pamphlets addressed to future Spitzelverpflichtete and SSD personnelxx which C had written.

c. A copy of the new CADROIT telephone book.

d. A report on the arrest of "Gustave Bianchen", As 5013/53. He was a PZ man, arrested on 30 Oct 53, who was closely involved in ZIPPER work (had serviced three dead drops and set up three others). Nothing was mentioned during his trial of the ~~CASTABIA~~ CADROIT connection.

He had not signed the CADROIT declaration of lack of connection with this procedure was not established until after the arrest. other orgs; ~~the procedure was not established until after the arrest.~~

In answer to queries, C stated that the arrestee did not know any other CADROIT MA's. His trial included that of five others charged with ZIPPER work.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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2. [] gave back ~~the~~ C's earlier submitted report re the arrest of Paul Schuster, noting that the arrest date (1953) was inconsistent with the ~~stated~~ date of last meeting (later in 1953). Probably the date of arrest should have read "1954"-would C check this out and return the report? He would.

3. [] noted that he had seen in the last monthly report that a former B-Abt. co-worker had been recruited as a Dresden MA by Dr. Maurer's section (although [] did not name the Referent who had done the recruiting). It was [] understanding that no former B-Abt. contacts in the D.R. were to be picked up by CADROIT, when and if, as could be expected, some of them came in to CADROIT. [] understood this had been ^{discussed with} ~~discussed with~~ [] Did C know the status of this matter? C stated that all concerned agreed that contact with former B-Abt. men should be avoided; but this matter had not yet been discussed in a staff meeting. It was a question of passing the word. [] suggested that C suggest [] that this item be covered in the next staff meeting. ^(22 Oct) C will do. This discussion gave [] a chance to ask C what he knew about the former B-Abt. C stated that it was once a part of CADROIT, but was later separated. It began with the screening of MA to see which could be used for special purposes. These men were transferred to the B-Abt. What were the special purposes? They were concerned with military espionage. C agreed with [] that the danger of contact with these former B-Abt. MA's was not theoretical, but quite real. ~~Especially if any~~ If any such men were associated in the future with CADROIT and later arrested, the SSD would learn not only of the separation but the "reunification" of the B-Abt. with CADROIT, thus tainting the latter with the "espionage" brush.

4. [] noted that the recent status report ~~referred~~ ^{SECRET} referred to info which had been received re Ihu Proksher, an important official of the Eastern ^{was going to travel to West Germany temporarily;} RR administration; this info had been given to "Sicherheits Organe". When asked for details, C stated that CADROIT had learned of the info, and thought

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they had enough proof to make a court case against the man. Abt. K5 had been informed by C, but had taken no action, believing that the proof was not quite sufficient, apparently. [] raised no ~~objection~~ objection, but requested that all such cases wherein a matter is ~~not~~ turned over to K5 be noted in C's monthly report. C treaded water, noting that there ~~were~~ were several types of matters which were turned over to K5 or the Amt fuer V.

Discussion developed that these were:

Concrete, substantial

- a. /Info re persons living in the West, which ~~information~~ is ~~not~~ furnished to the police by Abt. Strafrecht, not by C.
- b. "Kleine" info re persons living in the East which C furnishes to either K5 or the AfV (Hochwald). No action is usually taken by the recipients in these cases. There are many such transmissions, and they are relatively minor. ~~not~~ from West Berlin.
- c. Info re suspicious visitors to CADROIT/. Examples would be the Kian and Nikolai cases. In these cases, the case it self is turned over to the police.
- d. Info re persons living in the East, where the info is substantial and may call for action. These cases are smaller in number. Prekscher would be an example.
- e. Info re suspicious visitors from the East. ^{Blanche} ~~information~~ would be an example. C noted that it had earlier been agreed that all such cases would be reported to Pepin before being turned over to the police.

[] requested that C's monthly report include reference to all cases which were turned over to any other organization (as opposed to the relatively minor and numerous transmission of bits of info re persons). This would not change the requirement to inform [] before turning any cases of suspicious visitors over to the police. SECRET

If there were no such transfer of cases during the month, a negative report should be made. []

5. [] discussed with C in detail the earlier submitted security check sheets concerning I Str. After going through the preceding items on the form, a discussion of the lack of a ~~fire~~ plan for protection of files in event of fire took place. [] noted his feeling that it was important that there be such a plan, even though it ~~might not~~ need not be too complicated. What would happen, noted C, would be that the persons who work in the building would carry the files to the nearby garden - no plan was necessary. [] felt that a person should be named to be in charge of affairs in the event of fire, and that another person should be named (against wind, loss, etc.) to stay in the garden and protect the files which would be brought there. [] suggested that C discuss the matter with [] and have two appropriate persons named and briefed. At this point C stated in general that the security forms themselves, (and this fire plan in particular) were an example of just the sort of thing which takes his time away from other things which he should be doing, and which he did not think were worth the effort. ~~He~~ He referred to the forms and similar matters as "organizational, technical" matters which were not really in the security field, and at which C was not particularly and which did not give him any drive to do a good job. ~~He stated that he did not think that he should be doing such matters, but that he should be doing security work.~~ C stated that he was afraid that if he becomes weighed down with such matters, that he will become/a sort of "Office Manager" or "house superintendent", and that he will be prevented from doing the type of security work for which he has been trained. When [] noted that many of these matters were organizational matters, but that they involved a definite and predominant security element which concerned C, C stated that ~~as~~ as he saw it, the fire plan was the sort of thing which he should not work up himself, but that a DM 400/Month man should work up; C would then look it over ~~for~~ from the security standpoint and comment, approve, or ~~disapprove~~ disapprove. C complained that ~~he has been just a general~~ handy-man to whom such things as the forms have always been sent. This work

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was contrasted by C with the type of work which he used to do in the East Berlin police ministry. He had, for example, been given the problem of ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~writing the regulations concerning~~ ^{foot paths} ~~had written~~ ^{such a set of rules.} He had ~~written~~ analysed types of crimes and ~~written~~ set up categories of crimes for the purpose of determining how such crimes would be reported by the East Berlin police. This was the sort of work which C considered to be real security work and which gave him a feeling of satisfaction, and not the "aid of all work" house supervision which the forms and fire plan represented. C noted that ~~had been~~ ^{partially} ~~the only person who had~~ ^{really} understood C's feelings in this respect, and had in this regard started C writing drafts of pamphlets ~~concerned~~ ^{concerned} with SSD matters for later distribution.

6. C ~~answered~~ ^{answered} that many of the items in the security forms were organizational matters, but that they also had a high security interest—that was the purpose of the forms. The fire plan was a good example. The weakness had been brought to light by the forms (noting that an important part of C's work was to find and rectify just such weaknesses)—it was not necessary that C write a fire plan himself, but only to discuss the matter with ~~Radell~~ ^{Radell} ~~and see that two appropriate persons were named~~ ^{and briefed.} This was all there was to the matter. ~~realized~~ ^{realized} that C was busy, and that it was difficult to get enough time to do a piece of work in an ordered manner due to the constant interruptions—this was a common problem with which many people, including ~~had~~ ^{had} to live. Precisely ^{to} ~~help~~ ^{help} C in this respect, Ohlsen had been furnished him as an assistant. The latter could do much of the leg work; C should use Ohlsen as fully as possible in such things as the check sheets. In addition, after the security ~~check sheets~~ ^{check sheets} had been gotten under way, the amount of time necessary

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to complete them each month would be much lessxx than it is now. C did not deny that Ohlsen was a definite aid, but noted that ~~Mr~~ C did not set up his responsibilities and priorities, but that Ladell did. This made it a little difficult to use Ohlsen to the fullest extent possible. [] noted that he had not been aware of this, and would look into the matter with [] (and by implication with [] [] stated his feeling relatively free hand in using Ohlsen, in order that C should have a/ ~~freedom~~

that matters like the security check sheets should be properly accomplished. The main emphasis of [] remarks was to the effect that while all possible aid would be given to C in getting security/organizational matters like the check sheets accomplished, these matters were priority items which must be accomplished.

COMMENT: The above discussion has been reported in ~~detail~~ some detail because the files, discussions with previous case officers handling C, and Pepin's contact with C show it to be typical of ~~many~~ the reaction which can be expected from C. The most advisable course seems to be to (a) take away as far as possible C's arguments re lack of time, lack of sufficient freedom in using ~~many~~ assistants, etc, and (b) insist firmly and consistently that the "organizational" work given to him be done, even though it appears to be true that C's morale will not be improved by such work. This work is important; it will include detailed fragebogen info on new employees, ~~information~~ and similar matters. It seems advisable to insure that our and C's conceptions of what his function is jibe, even though this may run the risk of his seeking work ~~in~~ elsewhere.

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